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ABSTRACT
The legal status of medical marijuana in the United States is something
of a paradox. On one hand, the federal government has placed a ban on the
drug with no exceptions. On the other hand, forty percent of states have legalized its cultivation, distribution, and consumption for medical purposes. As
such, medical marijuana activity is at the same time proscribed (by the federal
government) and encouraged (by state governments through their systems of
regulation and taxation). This Article seeks to shed light on this unprecedented,
nebulous zone of legality in which an activity is both legal and illegal, what one
scholar on the subject has deemed "one of the most important federalism disputes in a generation." The issue has become heightened as two states have legalized marijuana for recreational (non-medical) purposes as a result of the
2012 Election.
This Article examines the issue from a federalism perspective. It begins
by arguing that unpredictable enforcement by federal authorities in states that
have legalized medical marijuana not only threatens state drug policy, but also
the efficacy of federal enforcement. This argument is based on the premise that
the federal drug ban exists as a collaborative effort between the states and the
federal government. That the federal government relies on the assistance, infrastructure, and know-how of state and local governments is evinced by, as an
example, the fact that ninety-nine percent of drug-related investigations and arrests are carried out by state agents. Federal enforcement in a state where medical marijuana is legal antagonizes the state authorities to the point where cooperating to enforce a dual-ban on drugs-like, for example, heroin-becomes
more difficult. A solution to this problem, this Article proposes, would be for
Congress to carve out an exemption from federal enforcement in states that
have legalized the drug. This proposal would exhibit the federal government's
respect for state drug policy, reestablish "cooperative federalism" between
states and the federal government, and allow the federal authorities to allocate
their limited resources to areas where they are likely to have lasting success.
It should be noted that this Article steers clear from making policy and
public health judgments or arguments about whether medical marijuana or other drugs should be legal at the state or federal level. The policy arguments on
both sides of the issue are vast and well-developed. Rather, this Article analyzes how the varying messages about whether and to what extent the federal government will enforce its ban poses a threat to cooperative federalism.
I.

INTRODUCTION

On October 19, 2009, Deputy Attorney General David Ogden issued a
memorandum with the subject line "Investigations and Prosecutions in States
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Authorizing the Medical Use of Marijuana."' The purpose of this memo was to
guide United States Attorneys in investigating and prosecuting marijuanarelated offenses vis-A-vis various state laws that permit the cultivation, sale, and
consumption of marijuana for medical purposes.2 The Ogden Memo instructed
that
prosecution of individuals with cancer or other serious illnesses
who use marijuana as part of a recommended treatment regimen consistent with applicable state law, or those caregivers in
clear and unambiguous compliance with existing state law who
provide such individuals with marijuana, is unlikely to be an
efficient use of limited federal resources.3
While the Ogden Memo reaffirmed the illegality of all forms of medical marijuana at the federal level, it made clear that the federal executive policy
with regards to medical marijuana permissible at the state level would be for
the most part hands-off.4
Partially as a result of the Ogden memo, the medical marijuana industry began to mushroom. Administrative agencies of states with laws permitting
the cultivation, sale, and consumption of medical marijuana began to issue licenses to farms and dispensaries. For example, in California-a state that permits the limited usage of medical marijuana 5-the result has been a billiondollar industry. 6 Anywhere between $50 and $100 million are collected in taxes-revenue that could prove vital to the state of California.' Despite their quasi-legal status, dispensaries and individual users of medical marijuana tightrope-walked the fine line of legality. The 2005 United States Supreme Court
decision Gonzales v. Raich made clear that persons engaging in the intrastate
cultivation, sale, or consumption of medical marijuana-even in full compliance with state laws and regulations-could be prosecuted for violations of the
I
Memorandum for Selected U.S. Attorneys, David W. Ogden, Deputy Attorney Gen. (Oct.
19, 2009), availableat http://www.justice.gov/opa/documents/medical-marijuana.pdf [hereinafter
Ogden Memo].
2
Id.
3

id.

4~

Id.

See CAL. HEALTH & SAFETY CODE § 11362.5 (West 2013).
Tim Dickinson, Obama's War on Pot, ROLLING STONE (Mar. 1, 2012), available at
http://www.rollingstone.com/politics/news/obamas-war-on-pot-20120216?print-true;
see also
Katherine Mangu-Ward, The Business of Medical Marituana,REASON (Apr. 7, 2012), available
at http://reason.com/archives/2012/04/13/the-business-of-medical-marijuana.
DEP'T OF JUSTICE, THE DEA POSITION ON MARIJUANA 14 (2011), available at
http://www.justice.gov/dea/docs/marijuanajposition_2011 .pdf; Francis Dinkelspiel, Berkeley
Cannabis Collectives Slapped with Huge Tax Bills, BERKELEYSIDE (Feb. 3, 2011, 7:00 AM),
http://www.berkeleyside.com/2011/02/03/berkeley-cannabis-collectives-slapped-with-huge-taxbills/.
5
6
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federal Controlled Substances Act (CSA), which characterizes medical marijuana as a Schedule I illegal drug.
Despite the Ogden Memo, the Federal Department of Justice (DOJ) is
now focusing efforts on prosecuting consumers and producers of medical marijuana who are acting in compliance with state laws. This was spurred by a
memorandum on the subject issued on June 29, 2011, by James Cole, Ogden's
successor as Deputy Attorney General, which limited the term "caregiver" only
to individual physicians and nurses.9 In California, United States Attorneys
have shut down hundreds of growers and dispensaries that were licensed and
regulated by the California Department of Health Services.
A looming problem with the changes in the federal executive policy
involves the way in which the federal drug prohibition is enforced. Essentially,
federal enforcement agents rely on the assistance, infrastructure, and know-how
of the states; just one example of this is the estimate that 99% of drug-related
investigations and arrests are carried out by state agents.o As such, the regulation of marijuana can be seen as a cooperation between the states and the federal government-what this Article will refer to as "cooperative federalism," a
term that refers not just to a state-federal cooperation, but also a collaboration
where states preserve authority to make policy and enforcement decisions."
However, conflicts and changes in marijuana laws and enforcement policyespecially as blatant as the Ogden-Cole Memos' shift-pose a potential disruption of this scheme of cooperation.
The 2012 Election heightened the stakes for the way in which marijuana is regulated. On November 6, 2012, voters in two states, Washington and
Colorado, approved ballot initiatives, which essentially legalized the limited
cultivation, distribution, possession, and usage of marijuana for recreationalin contrast to medical-purposes.12 Since then, these two referenda were signed
into law, making Washington and Colorado the only two states to have legalized non-medical marijuana.
But the legalization of recreational marijuana in Washington and Colorado is but one chapter in the history of the drug in the United States. Novel
545 U.S. 1 (2005).
Memorandum for Selected U.S. Attorneys, James Cole, Deputy Attorney Gen. (June 29,
2011), available at http://www.justice.gov/oip/docs/dag-guidance-2011-for-medical-marijuanause.pdf [hereinafter Cole Memo].
10
Robert A. Mikos, On the Limits of Supremacy: Medical Marituanaand the States' Overlooked Power to Legalize Federal Crime, 62 VAND. L. REv. 1421 (2009); Jessica Bulman-Pozen
& Heather K. Gerken, Uncooperative Federalism, 118 YALE L.J. 1256, 1283-84 (2009).
1' One scholar characterizes "cooperative federalism" as a "state-federal partnership in carrying out federal policy." JOHN D. NUGENT, SAFEGUARDING FEDERALISM: How STATES PROTECT
THEIR INTERESTS IN NATIONAL POLICYMAKING 170 (2009).
12
COLO. CONST. amend. LXIV, available at http://www.fcgov.com/mmj/pdf/ amendment64.pdf; 2013 Wash. Legis. Serv. ch. 3 (I.M. 502) (West) (Initiative Measure-MarijuanaLegalization and Regulation).
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about those ballot measures is that they legalize marijuana for recreational purposes; medical marijuana has been legal in California since 1996,13 and is now
permitted in one form or another in twenty-one of the fifty states as well as the
District of Columbia.14 As states began to take control of legislative policy with
regard to medical marijuana by passing laws permitting its limited usage, a
gray area of legality precipitated. On the one hand, the cultivation, distribution,
and usage of medical marijuana is permitted and, arguably, encouraged, by
many of the states through their systems of taxation and regulation; yet on the
other hand, it remains categorically forbidden at the federal level.' 5 This nebulous zone of legality has broader implications for the United States' system of
federalism. Indeed, one prominent scholar deemed the state-federal conflict of
marijuana laws to be "one of the most important federalism disputes in a gener-

ation."l6
This Article focuses on this nebulous zone of law enforcement, in
which an activity remains both a violation of federal law and one that is permitted and even, perhaps, encouraged by states and their regulatory schemes. The
about-face in federal executive policy as shown by the shift from the Ogden to
Cole Memos suggests that state regulation of medical marijuana can be defacto
undermined by the federal government through prosecution of individuals who
are otherwise following state laws and guidelines.17 This can be seen as a threat
to cooperative federalism: at one moment, state legislative acts and the voter
referenda assure states that they will be permitted to regulate medical marijuana
and implement the necessary bureaucracies and infrastructure to do so; at the
next, changes in federal law enforcement initiatives disrupt states' regulatory
schemes.
This Article-focusing on the conflict between federal law enforcement and California's laws and regulatory schemes over medical
na 8 -will proceed as follows: Part II provides the background about the legal
California's Compassionate Use Act was approved via voter referendum in 1996, and is
codified in California's Health and Safety Code. See CAL. HEALTH & SAFETY CODE
§ 11362.5(b)(1)(A) (West 2013).
14
See infra text accompanying note 26.
15
Marijuana remains prohibited at the federal level under the Controlled Substances Act. 21
U.S.C. §§ 841, 844 (2012).
16
Robert Mikos, On the Limits of FederalSupremacy: When States Relax (orAbandon) Marijuana Bans, 714 CATO INST. POL'Y ANALYSIS 1, 3 (Dec. 12, 2012), available at
http://object.cato.org/sites/cato.org/files/pubs/pdf/PA714.pdf. Professor Mikos has written extensively about the subject, particularly focusing on the questions of preemption and commandeering of state marijuana laws.
17
Compare Ogden Memo, supra note 1, with Cole Memo, supra note 9.
18 As noted, 21 states have legalized medical marijuana in one form or another. See infra note
26. In order to tighten the analysis, this Article focuses on the situation in California. Not only
was California the first state to legalize medical marijuana-and thus has the longest history of
the state-federal conflict of law-but it is also a hotbed of uncertainty when it comes to federal
13
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status of medical marijuana at both the state and federal levels. Part III analyzes
the state laws vis-A-vis the federal medical marijuana ban and the federalism
issues that arise out of the conflicting sovereign policies. Specifically, Part III
discusses the dejure power the federal government may or may not have to undermine the state laws through such doctrines as commandeering, preemption,
and conditional spending. Part III also explores the limitations of federal enforcement of the CSA and the ways in which the federal authorities rely on
state cooperation to enforce the drug bans. Part IV then analyzes the threat to
cooperative federalism caused by the inconsistent federal enforcement policy of
the federal drug enforcement scheme, which was designed to be a collaborative
effort, or cooperation, with the states. Part V turns to a brief examination of the
novel recreational marijuana initiatives of Washington and Colorado. Part V
places these new measures into the cooperative federalism story and anticipates
additional problems that may arise in light of this expansion of marijuana's legality. Finally, Part VI proposes a solution to the medical marijuana gray zone
of legality: a Congressional exemption to the federal ban on medical marijuana,
but only in states that have passed legislation allowing its limited usage.
It should be noted that this Article steers clear from making policy
judgments or arguments about whether medical marijuana or other drugs
should be legal at the state or federal levels. The policy arguments on both
sides are vast and well-developed. Rather, this Article analyzes the conflict and
threats to cooperative federalism posed by the varying messages about whether
and to what extent the federal government will enforce the drug ban.
II. THE LEGAL STATUS OF MEDICAL MARIJUANA

A.

California'sMedical MarifuanaLaws' 9

On November 5, 1996, California voters approved ballot measure referendum Proposition 215, effectively legalizing the limited and controlled usage and distribution of marijuana for medical purposes-the first state law of
its kind. Proposition 215, which became known as the Compassionate Use Act
(CUA), added section 11362.5 to California's Health and Safety Code. 20 Subenforcement and state cooperation. As explored more fully infra Part IV, California's highly lucrative and burgeoning medical marijuana industry has been threatened as of late with an increased focus of federal efforts on the enforcement of the CSA.
19
While this Article focuses on laws concerning marijuana for medical purposes, it should be
noted that since 1976, California has a policy of decriminalization for possession of small
amounts of marijuana. See S. B. 1449, 2010 Sess.
(Cal. 2010), available at
http://leginfo.legislature.ca.gov/faces/billNavClient.xhtml?bill-id=200920 1OOSB 1449&search k
eywords=; S.B. 95, 1976 Sess. (Cal. 1976); Prop. 36, 2000 Sess. (Cal. 2000).
20
The stated purpose of the Act is:
To ensure that seriously ill Californians have the right to obtain and use marijuana for medical purposes where that medical use is deemed appropriate and
has been recommended by a physician who has determined that the person's
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stantially, the CUA provides that the code sections prohibiting the possession
and cultivation of marijuana 2' shall not apply "to a patient, or to a patient's
primary caregiver, who possesses or cultivates marijuana for the personal medical purposes of the patient upon the written or oral recommendation or approval of a physician." 22 The CUA also protects physicians who recommend marijuana to patients for medical purposes from punishment under California's drug
laws.23 The list of conditions for which a physician may recommend medical
marijuana is not exhaustive-"any . . . illness for which marijuana provides relief' -but typically includes chronic conditions that involve severe pain, nausea, or muscle spasms.2 5 Since the passage of the CUA in 1996, twenty other
states and the District of Columbia have enacted laws-via the state legislative
process, popular ballot referendum, and even amendment of the state constitution-permitting the use and/or distribution of marijuana for medical purposes
in one form or another.2 6
health would benefit from the use of marijuana in the treatment of cancer,
anorexia, AIDS, chronic pain, spasticity, glaucoma, arthritis, migraine, or any
other illness for which marijuana provides relief.
CAL. HEALTH & SAFETY CODE § 11362.5(b)(1)(A) (West 2013).
21
Id. §§ 11357, 11358.
22
Id. § 11362.5(d).
23
Id. § 11362.5(c).
24
Id. § 11362.5(b)(1) ("The people of the State of California hereby find and declare that the
purposes of the Compassionate Use Act of 1996 are as follows: (A) To ensure that seriously ill
Californians have the right to obtain and use marijuana for medical purposes where that medical
use is deemed appropriate and has been recommended by a physician who has determined that
the person's health would benefit from the use of marijuana in the treatment of cancer, anorexia,
AIDS, chronic pain, spasticity, glaucoma, arthritis, migraine, or any other illness for which marijuana provides relief.").
25
Mikos, supra note 10, at 1428 & n.19.
26
The 21 states that have legalized medical marijuana in one form or another are Alaska, Arizona, California, Colorado, Connecticut, Delaware, Hawaii, Illinois, Maine, Maryland, Massachusetts, Michigan, Montana, Nevada, New Hampshire, New Jersey, New Mexico, Oregon,
Rhode Island, Vermont, and Washington. See ALASKA STAT. § 17.37.030 (2013); ARIZ. REV.
STAT. § 36-2811 (2012); CAL. HEALTH & SAFETY CODE § 11362.5(b)(1)(A) (West 2013); COLO.
CONST. art. XVIII, § 14; CONN. H.B. No. 5389, 2013 Conn. Acts 12-55 (Reg. Sess.); DEL. CODE
ANN. tit. 16, § 4903A (2013); HAW. REV. STAT. § 329-122 (2013); ILL. HB 0030 97th Gen.
Assem. (2013); ME. REV. STAT. ANN. tit. 22, § 2383 (2012); MD. CODE ANN., CRIM. LAW § 5601(c)(3)(ii)
(2013);
2012
Mass.
Acts
ch.
369,
available
at
https://malegislature.gov/Laws/SessionLaws/Acts/2012/Chapter369; MICH. COMP. LAWS SERV. §
333.26421 (LexisNexis 2013); MONT. CODE ANN. § 50-46-301 (2013); NEV. REV. STAT. §
453A.010 (2013); N.H. H.B. 575-FV (2013); N.J. STAT. ANN. § 24:61-1 (West 2013); N.M. STAT.
ANN. § 26-2B-1 (West 2013); OR. REV. STAT. § 475.300 (2013); R.I. GEN. LAWS § 21-28.6-1
(2011); VT. STAT. ANN. tit. 18, § 4471 (2013); WASH. REV. CODE § 69.51A.005 (2013).
The legality of medical marijuana in the District of Columbia is interesting. Like the 21
states which allow for medical marijuana, the District also has a code provision allowing for the
limited usage, distribution, and cultivation of marijuana for medical purposes. D.C. CODE § 71671.02 (2013). However, unlike the states, after the passage of the Amendment Act B 18-622
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In 2003, California Governor Gray Davis signed into law Senate Bill
420, or the Medical Marijuana Program Act, which defined the scope of the
CUA and laid the foundation for regulating access to and distribution of medical marijuana. 2 7 The Medical Marijuana Program (MMP) required the Department of Health Services to set up a comprehensive program to monitor the distribution of medical marijuana. The Program mandated specific regulatory
duties to county health departments related to the issuance and monitoring of
identification cards issued to legitimate patients who are qualified to purchase,
possess, and use marijuana for medical purposes. 2 9 The District of Columbia
and many of the other states with laws permitting the possession of medical
marijuana have also passed laws setting up similar regulatory schemes.3 o
California case law has refined the scope of CUA and MMP, and has
attempted to clarify what protections the laws provide to patients and recommending physicians. The California Supreme Court has held that "the CUA
provides an affirmative defense to the [prosecution of] the crimes of' possession, distribution, or cultivation of marijuana. 3 ' The CUA does not provide
immunity from arrest to suspects where law enforcement officers have probable
cause to believe an unlawful possession or cultivation has occurred.32 However,
the California Supreme Court has held that the MMP, with its regulatory system of voluntary identification cards for medical marijuana, was "designed to
protect against [the] unnecessary arrest" of patients possessing or using marijuana in compliance with the CUA and MMP. 33 Additionally, the Court has also
held that certain provisions in the MMP-which limit the amount of marijuana
patients or caregivers may lawfully possess under the CUA-unconstitutionally

and its signage into law by the mayor, the law underwent a 30-day Congressional review period,
during which neither the Senate nor House of Representatives acted to reject the law, which
therefore went into effect. Because the federal Controlled Substances Act-which categorically
proscribes marijuana included that used for medical purposes-applies to the District of Columbia, it seems that the federal legislature has simultaneously and paradoxically approved and prohibited medical marijuana in the District.
27
See S.B. 420, 2003 Sess. (Cal. 2003), available at http://www.leginfo.ca.gov/pub/0304/bill/sen/sb_0401-0450/sb_420_bill_20031012_chaptered.html.
28
S.B. 420, 2003 Sess. (Cal. 2003), available at http://www.leginfo.ca.gov/pub/0304/bill/sen/sb_0401-0450/sb_420_bill_20031012_chaptered.html.
29
Id. The California Department of Health Services provides a list of local health department
regulators on its website. Medical Maryuana Program County Programs and Business Hours,
CAL. DEPT. OF PuB. HEALTH, http://www.cdph.ca.gov/services/Pages/MMPCounties.aspx (last
visited Oct. 17, 2013).
30
See supra text accompanying note 26.
31
People v. Wright, 146 P.3d 531, 534 (Cal. 2006); People v. Mower, 49 P.3d 1067 (Cal.
2002).
Mower, 49 P.3d at 1073-74.
32
3
People v. Kelly, 222 P.3d 186, 212 (Cal. 2010); Cnty. of San Diego v. San Diego NORML,
81 Cal. Rptr. 3d 461, 485 (Ct. App. 2008).

https://researchrepository.wvu.edu/wvlr/vol116/iss1/4

8

Grabarsky: Conflicting Federal and State Medical Marijuana Policies: A Threa
2013]

CONFLICTING FEDERAL & STATE MEDICAL MARIJUANA POLICIES

9

burden the statutory defense of possessing or cultivating marijuana for medical
purposes. 34
B.

FederalDrug Laws ConcerningMedical Marijuana

In 1970, Congress passed the Controlled Substances Act (CSA),s a
comprehensive federal law, which classifies marijuana in Schedule I-the most
restrictive category-essentially making all forms of cultivation, distribution,
and possession a federal crime. 36 The federal government's steadfast ban on
marijuana is categorical and virtually without exception. 37 The cultivation, distribution, and possession of marijuana for medical purposes, of course, remain
unlawful under the CSA. Both Congress and the Drug Enforcement Agency
(DEA)-the federal administrative enforcer of the CSA-have rejected proposals to reschedule or suspend enforcement against persons who utilize the
drug in compliance with state medical marijuana laws and programs.38 The
United States Supreme Court, in United States v. Oakland Cannabis Buyers'

Cooperative, has deferred to Congress' steadfast determination that marijuana
has no medical benefit and has interpreted the CSA in such a way that leaves
no room for a common law medical marijuana exception or medical necessity
defense.
The seminal case of Gonzales v. Raich affirmed the constitutionality of
the CSA even as applied to extremely localized marijuana-related activities. 40
The issue in Raich was whether the Commerce Clause 4 1 permitted Congress,
via the CSA, to ban the growth and consumption of marijuana where that marijuana was grown locally, using only local inputs, and did not enter into the interstate markets.42 The case involved the respondents' growth and consumption

34

Kelly, 222 P.3d at 211-12.

Comprehensive Drug Abuse and Control Act of 1970, Pub. L. No. 91-513, 84 Stat. 1236
(1970) (codified as amended at 21 U.S.C. §§ 801-971 (2012)).
36
21 U.S.C. §§ 841, 844 (2012).
3

n
The only means of legally obtaining marijuana are through the sole federally-approved
grow-site at the University of Mississippi or by participating in an FDA-approved research study.
However, only a tiny amount of the population could have access to marijuana through these
means: the University of Mississippi program stopped accepting new applications in 1992 and
only eight patients receive marijuana through it, while the FDA has only approved eleven research studies since 2000. Mikos, supra note 10, at 1433-34.
38

Id at 1434.

3
532 U.S. 483 (2001); see United States v. Burton, 894 F.2d 188 (6th Cir. 1990), cert. denied,498 U.S. 857 (1990).
40
545 U.S. 1 (2005).
41
U.S. CONST. art. I, § 8, cl. 3 ("[The Congress shall have Power] [t]o regulate Commerce
with foreign Nations, and among the several States, and with the Indian Tribes ....
42
Raich, 545 U.S. at 5.
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of medical marijuana, in full compliance with the California CUA.4 3 The Court,
in a 6-3 decision, held that this activity, though wholly intrastate, was susceptible to regulation through Congress' Commerce Clause power because such activity, in the aggregate, could have a substantial impact on the interstate market
for the extremely popular and fungible commodity that is marijuana.44 Raich
gave constitutional approval to the application of the CSA to individuals who
were utilizing marijuana in compliance with state laws and regulations.45
Therefore, since Raich, it remains clear that compliance with state drug laws
and regulations cannot be used as a defense from arrest or prosecution under
federal drug laws. Under the doctrine of the supremacy of the federal government, those state laws, of course, cannot take precedence over the CSA. 46
III. A SCHRODINGER'S CAT OF LEGALITY 47
As shown, California's laws and regulations permitting the limited utilization of medical marijuana are, on their surface, in conflict with the federal
CSA, which categorically prohibits marijuana even for medical purposes. This
creates a virtually unchartered situation where an activity is lawful at the state
level, while at the same time is prohibited by federal law.4 8 Many jurists, often
looking for uniform rules of general applicability, might see this as a problem.
And proponents of a uniform system may argue that the confusing quasi-legal
status of medical marijuana can and should be resolved by a robust assertion of
the federal government of its supremacy over the states. Accordingly, this Part
explores possible ways in which the federal government, through its de jure

43

Id at 7.

Id. at 28-33.
Id. at 27-29.
46
See U.S. CONST. art. VI, cl. 2 ("[T]he Laws of the United States ... shall be the supreme
Law of the Land .... ); see also Oakland CannabisBuyers' Coop., 532 U.S. 483.
47
Physicist Erwin Schr6dinger's famous thought experiment places a cat inside a box containing a flask of poison that is cracked open at a random time. As an explanation to explain
quantum theory, Schrodinger proposed that before the box is opened, the cat can be thought of as
simultaneously dead and alive. See Erwin Schr6dinger, Die gegenwdirtige Situation in der Quantenmechanik, 23 DIE NATURWISsENSCHAFTEN 807-12, 823-28, 844-49 (1935), cited in Denke v.
Shoemaker, 198 P.3d 284, 302 n.2 (Mont. 2008). Justice James C. Nelson of the Montana Supreme Court used this analogy when discussing the precarious legal state of medical marijuana.
See Mont. Cannabis Indus. Ass'n v. State, 286 P.3d 1161, 1169 (Mont. 2012) (Nelson, J., dissenting).
48
This Article takes the position that this situation-where the federal government, pursuant
to a legislative act, bans one activity yet the states permit and regulate that very same activity,
also pursuant to legislation-is without precedent. However, Professor Mikos has suggested otherwise, offering as examples of activities federal government attempts to ban "certain abortion
procedures, physician-assisted suicide, needle exchange programs, and possession of certain
types of firearms" that would otherwise have been permitted at the state level. See Mikos, supra
note 10, at 1479-80; Mikos, supra note 16, at 26.
4

45
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constitutional authority or de facto executive powers of law enforcement, may
resolve this Schrodinger's Cat of legality in which activities related to medical
marijuana are simultaneously lawful and unlawful.49 Part IV then explores the
threat to federalism caused by the most effective remaining means for the federal government to undermine state drug laws-federal law enforcement.
A.

De Jure Possibilitiesto Reconcile the Conflict ofLaws

Several federalism doctrines-the most apparent of which include legislative preemption, federal commandeering, and Congressional conditional
spending-have been suggested as the vehicle by which the federal government
can ensure that either (1) state laws conform to the federal marijuana ban, or (2)
state officials continue to assist in executing the federal proscription of medical
marijuana in spite of state laws that would otherwise allow it. However, this
Part argues that state allowances of medical marijuana will remain immune to
attempts by the federal government to subvert them through such federalism
doctrines as those listed above. In other words, the federalism doctrines of
preemption, commandeering, and conditional spending are not an effective
means for the federal government to dejure undermine state laws.
1.

Commandeering

Though it has not attempted to do so, Congress would not be able to
compel California to subvert its own medical marijuana legislation by requiring
the state to expend its own funds to carry out the federal ban. The so-called
"anti-commandeering" doctrine prevents the federal government from requiring
states to pay for a federal policy.50 Nor would the federal government be able to
commandeer state officials to enforce or administer the CSA because of the
same principle. 5 1 While the option of federal commandeering is easily dismissed as unconstitutional, it is important to note this given that the federal
drug laws were designed as a cooperative scheme the federal drug laws. Indeed,
the states do willingly assist in the enforcement of federal and state drug laws,
often in exchange for federal resources, but the anti-commandeering doctrine
makes clear that they cannot be forced to do so.
2.

Preemption

The California medical marijuana laws would not be subject to principles of federal preemption. The CSA explicitly states:

49
5o

51

See supra text accompanying note 47.
New York v. United States, 505 U.S. 144, 202-03 (1992).
Printz v. United States, 521 U.S. 898, 913-17 (1997).
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No provision of this title shall be construed as indicating an intent on the part of the Congress to occupy the field in which
that provision operates, including criminal penalties, to the exclusion of any State law on the same subject matter which
would otherwise be within the authority of the State, unless
there is a positive conflict between that provision of this title
and that State law so that the two cannot consistently stand together.5 2
Therefore, in order for a state medical marijuana law to be preempted
by the federal scheme, it would have to be in direct conflict with the federal
ban.53 Thus far, courts have not read the CUA or MMP as directly conflicting
with the CSA.54 The basic rationale for this is that California drug laws do not
positively encourage or require the use of medical marijuana (which may result
in a direct conflict with the CSA); rather, they prevent the state executive
branch from prosecuting the limited usage of marijuana for medical purposes as
a state-as opposed to a federal-crime.55 Preemption also does not apply because the California laws do not purport to provide an exemption or immunity
from prosecution under the federal drug laws. 6
Various California state courts have also ruled that the CUA and MMP
are not preempted by federal drug laws like the CSA under a very similar rationale as the federal courts. This is also the affirmative position taken by the

52

21 U.S.C. § 903 (2012).

See Gade v. Nat'1 Solid Wastes Mgmt. Ass'n, 505 U.S. 88 (1992); In re Tobacco Cases II,
163 P.3d 106 (Cal. 2007).
54
See Gonzales v. Raich, 545 U.S. 1 (2005) (upholding the constitutionality of the CSA as
applied to federal drug offenses acting in compliance with California state law, and not making a
ruling on the issue of preemption); see also Mikos, supra note 16, at 9.
5
See Arizona v. United States, No. CV 11 -1072-PHX-SRB (D. Ariz. Jan. 4, 2012) (upholding, despite contrary federal law, an Arizona state voter referendum legalizing the limited sale
and use of medical marijuana); United States v. Stacy, 734 F. Supp. 2d 1074, 1079 n.l (S.D. Cal.
2010) ("The federal government's enforcement of federal drug laws does not preempt state law.
California is free to pass and enforce its own laws regarding medical marijuana."); United States
v. Cannabis Cultivators Club, 5 F. Supp. 2d 1086, 1094 (N.D. Cal. 1998) ("Indeed, Proposition
215 on its face purports only to exempt certain patients and their primary caregivers from prosecution under certain Californiadrug laws .... ); but see United States v. Landa, 281 F. Supp. 2d
1139, 1143-45 (N.D. Cal. 2003) (suggesting, with regard to an issue of a departure from sentencing guidelines, that California law permitting limited use of medical marijuana could be preempted by federal law because it could compromise federal interest in discouraging marijuana use).
56
CannabisCultivators Club, 5 F. Supp. 2d at 1094.
5
See Qualified Patients Ass'n v. City of Anaheim, 115 Cal. Rptr. 3d 89 (Ct. App. 2010)
(holding that state laws decriminalizing possession of marijuana for medical purposes are not
preempted by federal laws); Cnty. of San Diego v. San Diego NORML, 81 Cal. Rptr. 3d 461 (Ct.
App. 2008) (holding that the CUA and the MMP's identification card program are not preempted
by the CSA because they do not positively conflict with the federal law nor impede the objectives
behind the CSA); City of Garden Grove v. Superior Court, 68 Cal. Rptr. 3d (Ct. App. 2007) (re5
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California Attorney General, who has stated that neither the CUA nor the MMP
conflicts with the federal CSA because in enacting those state laws, "California
did not 'legalize' medical marijuana, but instead exercised the state's reserved
powers to not punish certain marijuana offenses under state law when a physician has recommended its use to treat a serious medical condition."58 In that regard, the Attorney General recommends that "state and local law enforcement
officers not arrest individuals or seize marijuana under federal law when the officer determines from the facts available that the cultivation, possession, or
transportation is permitted under California's medical marijuana laws."s9
Also, it has been argued that even if courts would hold that the CSA
preempts some aspects of the California medical marijuana laws, the anticommandeering doctrine may block the preemption or prevent it from having
any affect. The rationale proceeds as follows: the CUA and MMP are laws that
prevent the California state government from taking action; namely, they prevent California law enforcement officials from prosecuting and punishing those
who engage in medical marijuana activity as an exception to the state ban on
marijuana, generally. Striking the CUA or MMP from the California Code-as
preemption would do, rendering them unconstitutional vis-i-vis the Supremacy
Clause-would result in re-instating the medical marijuana ban at the state level. Therefore, it can be argued, such preemption would in fact be an unconstitutional commandeering if the federal government were to require California to
implement legislation and take executive action against medical marijuana.o
3.

Conditional Spending

In theory, Congress could coax the California state legislature to repeal
the medical marijuana laws or enforce the CSA through its conditional spending powers. For example, if California retains the CUA and MMP and continues to fail to prosecute users and distributers of medical marijuana, Congress
could threaten to revoke federal monetary assistance to state drug enforcement
agents or even to take money away from anti-drug programs in public

turn of seized marijuana pursuant to the MMP was not precluded by principles of federal
preemption). But see Pack v. Superior Court, 132 Cal. Rptr. 3d 633, 651 (Ct. App. 2011) (finding
that California ordinances which "establish[ ] a permit scheme for medical marijuana collectives
stand[ ] as an obstacle to the" CSA and thus are preempted by the federal law), rev granted268
P.3d 1063 (2012).
5
EDMUND G. BROWN, JR., ATTORNEY GEN., CALIF. DEP'T OF JUSTICE, Guidelinesfor the Security and Non-Diversion of Marijuana Grown for Medical Use, Aug. 2008, at 3, availableat
http://medicahnarijuana.procon.org/sourcefiles/BrownGuidelines_AugO8.pdf.
5
Id. at 4.
6
Professor Mikos explains this idea in great detail in Mikos, supra note 10, and in Mikos,
supra note 16, at 10-12.
61 See South Dakota v. Dole, 483 U.S. 203 (1987).
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schools. 62 However, this is highly unlikely considering that the prosecution of
drug crimes is executed almost entirely by state agents, as is explained in the
next subpart of this Article. 63 Revoking drug enforcement-related funding
would likely have an overall negative effect on the federal government's drug
wars. Furthermore, it has been argued that, given the extremely popular support
for medical marijuana laws and exemptions, Congress would be unlikely to
pass legislation to that effect." In fact, Congress has rejected proposed legislation which would effectively divert federal grants from state drug authorities to
federal authorities in states that have adopted medical marijuana laws.
B.

FederalExecutive Law Enforcement

Notwithstanding the arguments that constitutional limits on federal
preemption, commandeering, and conditional spending would not allow the
federal government to circumvent California's medical marijuana laws, the
federal government still has another means at its disposal to subvert the state
drug laws: enforcing the CSA itself. No constitutional barrier would likely confront this option as the federal executive branch is charged with the task of enforcing federal laws, like the CSA, within states.6 6
It is doubtful, however, that this strategy would prove effective. In his
study on this subject, Professor Robert Mikos concluded that the federal government simply "does not have the resources to impose [CSA sanctions] frequently enough to make a meaningful impact on proscribed behavior."" Professor Mikos cites various DOJ statistics in reaching this conclusion. First, only
about 4,400 federal law enforcement agents work for the DEA, or about 4% of
all federal law enforcement agents. Next, federal agents only account for
about 30,000 annual drug arrests-roughly 7,000 of these are for marijuana-a
number which Mikos calculates to be 1.6% of all drug arrests and less than 1%
of all arrests for marijuana-related violations.69 Furthermore, he estimates that
See id. (allowing Congress to impose conditional spending as long as the conditions are
related to a legitimate federal interest particular to the spending).
63
See infra Part III.B.
62

6
Mikos, supra note 10, at 1461-62 (citing that over 70% of the population supports medical
exemptions to marijuana bans and claiming that President Obama would likely veto Congressional measures to withhold federal funds from states that have such exemptions).
65
H.R. 2086, 108th Cong, 149 Cong. Rec. H8962 (2003); Mikos, supra note 10, at 1462 &
n.146.
66
See U.S. CONST. art. II, § 1, cl. 1.
67
Mikos, supra note 16, at 19.
68
Id. (citing BUREAU OF JUSTICE STATISTIC, U.S. DEP'T OF JUSTICE, Drugs and Crime Facts
(August 17, 2009), http://www.ojp.usdoj.gov/bjs/dcf/enforce.htm).
6
BUREAU OF JUSTICE STATISTIC, U.S. DEP'T OF JUSTICE, Drugs and Crime Facts (August 17,
2009), http://www.ojp.usdoj.gov/bjs/dcf/enforce.htm); Id. (citing FEDERAL JUSTICE STATISTICS
and Booked
by
Offense,
2007,
CENTER,
Persons Arrested
RESOURCE
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14.4 million people in the United States regularly use marijuana each year and
about 1.4 million do so "legally" under a state exemption for medicinal marijuana. 70 Finally, Mikos concludes, in a world where states would not cooperate
with the enforcement of the CSA's medical marijuana prohibitions, federal authorities would be able to discover and penalize only 0.05 % of medical marijuana infractions. 7 As such, the federal government's going-it-alone, so to speak,
is not likely to make a sizeable dent in the reduction of medical marijuana usage, especially considering that "many deem it a life-changing medicine." 72
Federal reliance on state agents in eradicating marijuana and other
drugs could be one of the reasons for the CSA's language that expressly bars
field preemption.73 If Congress so intended or desired, it could have written the
CSA to occupy the entire field of drug enforcement, thereby preventing the
states from enacting their own drug-related criminal laws. 74 However, if this
were the case, drug enforcement efforts would be all but futile: As explained
earlier, the federal government hardly has the resources or know-how to pursue
local drug crimes and the anti-commandeering doctrine would prevent Congress from conscripting state enforcement agents. Therefore, allowing states to
dictate their own drug enforcement and regulatory policy, as the CSA indeed
does, is essential to the CSA's mission of drug prohibition.

http://fjsrc.urban.org/var.cfn?ttype=one-variable&agency=USMS&dbtype=ArrestsFed&saf-I
N.
70

Id

71

Id
Id. Professor Mikos also notes that federal efforts to shut down dispensaries and other large

72

suppliers of medical marijuana have and would continue to prove futile. See id at 20-21. This
issue is explored infra Part IV.
The notion that the federal government relies on state and local law enforcement to execute
the ban on marijuana and other drugs has been acknowledged by the federal government. In a
recent memorandum issued in August 2013, Deputy Attorney General James Cole wrote the following on the subject:
[T]he federal government has traditionally relied on states and local law enforcement agencies to address marijuana activity through enforcement of
their own narcotics laws. For example, the Department of Justice has not historically devoted resources to prosecuting individuals whose conduct is limited to possession of small amounts of marijuana for personal use on private
property. Instead, the Department has left such lower-level or localized activity to state and local authorities ....
Cole Memo, supra note 9. For more on Cole's 2013 memorandum, see infra text accompanying
notes 119-123.
73
21 U.S.C. § 903 (2012) ("No provision of this subehapter shall be construed as indicating
an intent on the part of the Congress to occupy the field in which that provision operates, including criminal penalties, to the exclusion of any State law on the same subject matter which would
otherwise be within the authority of the State . . . .").
74
In other words, Congress could have expressly preempted the entire field of drug regulation. See Gade v. Nat'l Solid Wastes Mgmt. Ass'n, 505 U.S. 88 (1992).
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IV. SHIFTING IN FEDERAL EXECUTIVE ENFORCEMENT POLICY:
A THREAT TO COOPERATIVE FEDERALISM

This Article now turns to the situation on the ground, exploring the
ways in which the federal executive-through efforts of the DEA and DOJhas sought to enforce the federal drugs ban on medical marijuana despite its
limited legalization in California since the passage of the CUA in 1996. This
Part then argues that these changes in federal enforcement policy threaten state
autonomy and federalism itself because they unfairly subject the states to the
whims of the federal government. This is especially true in an area-drug enforcement-with extremely limited federal resources, and which, arguably, was
envisioned as a joint state-federal cooperative enforcement scheme. In other
words, these federal executive fluctuations are a threat to cooperative federalism.
A.

Recent Changes in FederalEnforcement of the CSA

June 29, 2011, marks a mid-Obama Administration shift in the federal
executive policy concerning enforcement of federal drug laws against distributors and dispensaries operating in full compliance with state regulations. On
that date, the DOJ released the Cole Memo, which sought to clarify confusion
among United States Attorneys regarding the Ogden Memo. Specifically, the
Cole Memo revitalized the drug enforcement focus to prosecution of "commercial operations cultivating, selling or distributing marijuana," making no distinction between the cultivation, sale, or distribution of marijuana for nonmedical purposes and that for medical purposes. The memo also stated that
the illegality of medical marijuana at the federal level-as well as compliance
with state laws-provides no defense from federal prosecution and punishment. Finally, in a foreshadow of the reality to come in the next months, the
Memo noted that individuals as well as banking institutions "who engage in
transactions involving the proceeds of such activity may also be in violation of
federal money laundering statutes and other federal financial laws." 78
Since the Cole Memo, the federal government markedly shifted its policy and execution of drug laws in California, an about-face which has resulted
in a crackdown some commentators consider to be more severe than the pre7s
76

Cole Memo, supra note 9.
Id

n
Id. ("Persons who are in the business of cultivating, selling or distributing marijuana, and
those who knowingly facilitate such activities, are in violation of the Controlled Substances Act,
regardless of state law. Consistent with resource constraints and the discretion you may exercise
in your district, such persons are subject to federal enforcement action, including potential prosecution. State laws or local ordinances are not a defense to civil or criminal enforcement of federal
law with respect to such conduct, including enforcement of the CSA.").
78
Id.; see text accompanying infra note 88.
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Ogden Bush Administration policy. 79 The most pointed illustration of this new
policy was a press conference on October 7, 2011, during which four of the top
United States Attorneys in California announced a series of new measures they
were planning to undertake to combat the spread of medical marijuana.80 The
group announced that distribution cooperatives have availed themselves of the
CUA and MMP in order to earn profits on the sale of medical marijuana.
They also iterated that compliance with state laws is not a defense or justification for immunity from federal prosecution. 82 The measures the group outlined
included filing civil lawsuits against owners of property that allow the distributors to operate, in addition to filing criminal charges.
Right after the press conference, federal law enforcement agents began
to take increased action. Since October, federal agents have closed nearly twothirds of the more than 200 medical marijuana distributors in San Diego.84
Within a month after the press conference, sixteen California dispensaries received warning letters from federal prosecutors to stop sales or risk criminal
charges or property seizure. The U.S. Attorney in San Diego announced that
she would target media outlets that advertise for medical marijuana dispensa-

7
See, e.g., Dickinson, supra note 6 ("[Olver the past year, the Obama Administration has
quietly unleashed a multiagency crackdown on medical cannabis that goes far beyond anything
undertaken by George W. Bush."); Joshua Sabatini, Obama 'Worse' than Bush, Clinton on Pot,
Lawmaker Says, S.F. EXAMINER (Oct. 7, 2011), http://www.sfexaminer.com/sanfrancisco/obamaworse-than-bush-clinton-on-pot-state-lawmaker-says/Content?oid=2183172
("Today's
announcement by the Department of Justice means that Obama's medical marijuana policies are
worse than Bush and Clinton." (quoting California Assembly member Tom Ammiano)); Jacob
Sullum, Bummer: Barack Obama Turns Out to Be Just Another Drug Warrior, REASON (Oct.
2011) available at http://reason.com/archives/2011/09/12/bummer ("[M]edical marijuana raids
have been more frequent under Obama than under Bush, when there were about 200 over eight
years.").
80
See Michael B. Marois & Christopher Palmeri, U.S. Takes Aim at California's$1 Billion
Marijuana
Dispensaries,
BLOOMBERG
BUSINESSWEEK
(Oct.
8,
2011),
http://www.businessweek.com/news/2011-10-08/u-s-takes-aim-at-california-s- 1-billionmarijuana-dispensaries.html.
81
Id.
82
83

Id.
Daniel B. Wood, Showdown in California over Medical Marifuana, as Feds Crack Down,

SCIENCE
MONITOR
(Oct.
7,
2011),
http://www.csmonitor.comiUSA/Justice/2011/1007/Showdown-in-California-over-medicalmarijuana-as-feds-crack-down.
84
Daniel B. Wood, Confusion Reigns over Medical Marituana as States and Feds Clash,
CHRISTIAN
SCIENCE
MONITOR
(Dec.
13,
2011),
http://www.csmonitor.com/USA/Justice/2011/1213/Confusion-reigns-over-medical-marijuanaas-states-and-Feds-clash.
85
Wood, supra note 83.
CHRISTIAN
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ries.86 And most recently, federal authorities in Oakland raided four sites of
Oaksterdam University-an organization on the front lines of the movement to
legalize, tax, and regulate medical and recreational marijuana.8 7 Other executive departments have come to the aid of the DEA and DOJ: The Treasury Department has pressured banks to close accounts of medical marijuana businesses; the IRS has imposed additional taxes on dispensaries; and the Bureau of
Alcohol, Tobacco, Firearms and Explosives has ruled that card-carrying patients who receive medical marijuana cannot purchase firearms.
B.

The Threat to CooperativeFederalism

As was shown in Part III.A, the state medical marijuana laws are here
to stay. Due to the state-federal cooperative aspect of the CSA, it is unlikely
that Congress will attempt to preempt the state drug laws, and there have been
no inklings that federal appellate courts will find an implied preemption.89
Moreover, it remains unlikely that the federal government will be able to commandeer or coax the state executive agencies into increasing enforcement or
abandoning the state policies regarding medical marijuana. 90 With reconciliation unlikely to come about via the federal legislature or judiciary, the federal
executive has attempted to subvert the state medical marijuana laws through increased federal enforcement. This attempt, however, is an unsustainable, shortterm fix to reconcile the conflicting state-federal laws because the federal government simply does not have enough resources to continue prosecuting all
medical marijuana dispensaries acting in compliance with California state law.
Therefore, the Cole Memo's federal policy shift and increased federal
enforcement of the CSA can only be seen as an attempt to disrupt state medical
marijuana laws through the federal executive branch. The policy of unpredictable, increased enforcement has resulted in antagonizing states like California
which were designated-under the CSA and comprehensive federal drug policy-as allies in fighting the War on Drugs. Examples of this range from the idiosyncratic to the more serious. Pertaining to the former category, after an increase in raids on California medical marijuana dispensaries in the early years
of the Bush Administration, the mayor and several city council members of
Michael Montgomery, Feds to Target Radio, Newspapers for Medical Martjuana Ads,
CAL. WATCH
(Oct. 12, 2011), http://californiawatch.org/dailyreport/feds-target-radionewspapers-medical-marijuana-ads- 13049.
8
Matthew Artz, Paul Thissen & Harry Harris, Feds Raid Several OaklandMedical Marijuana Sites, MERCURY NEWS (Apr. 3, 2012, 8:17 AM), http://www.mercurynews.com/alamedacounty/ci_20307177/.
88
Julian Brookes, Where Does Obama Stand on the Medical Marijuana Crackdown?,
ROLLING STONE (Nov. 7, 2011, 1:11 PM), http://www.rollingstone.com/politics/blogs/nationalaffairs/where-does-obama-stand-on-the-medical-marijuana-crackdown-20111107.
89
See supra Part III.A.
90
See supra Part III.A.
86
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Santa Cruz observed a medical marijuana giveaway, specifically in protest of a
federal raid on a local cannabis collective. 9 ' More seriously, though, in 2008,
California state legislators introduced a bill that would bar state law enforcement officials from assisting federal executive agents in executing the federal
drug policy that diverges from state law.92 And, as described, the official policy
of the California Department of Justice is also one of non-cooperation:
In light of California's decision to remove the use and cultivation of physician-recommended marijuana from the scope of
the state's drug laws, this Office recommends that state and local law enforcement officers not arrest individuals or seize
marituanaunderfederal law when the officer determines from
the facts available that the cultivation, possession, or transportation is permitted under California's medical marijuana

laws. 93
In response to a statement by a spokesman for the Los Angeles U.S.
Attorney General that "[a]t the end of the day, California law doesn't matter,"
the California State Attorney General expressed concern that "an overly broad
federal enforcement campaign will make it more difficult for legitimate patients
to access physician-recommended medicine in California." 94
In the context of the CSA and nationwide drug enforcement, cooperation between the state and federal governments is crucial. Federalism in this
sense, can be viewed as a cooperation between the states and the federal govemiment, or, as noted, what one scholar characterizes as a "state-federal partnership in carrying out federal policy." 95 The term "cooperative federalism" is
particularly apropos in this context, given the federal government's dependency on state enforcement and regulatory efforts to carry out the CSA. 96 The federal executive's disruption of the state drug enforcement and regulatory scheme
abrogates the cooperative effort whereby the state and federal government have
a unity of interests-for example, enforcing the marijuana prohibition against
non-medical recreation users or users and distributors of other drugs that re-

91
Charlie LeDuff & Adam Liptak, Defiant Calfornia City Hands Out Marijuana, N.Y.
TIMES, Sept. 18, 2002, at A22, available at http://www.nytimes.com/2002/09/18/us/defiantcalifomia-city-hands-out-marijuana.html.
92
A.B.
2743,
2008
Assemb.,
Reg.
Sess.
(Cal.
2008),
available at
http://www.leginfo.ca.gov/pub/07-08/bill/asm/ab_2701-2750/ab_2743_bill_20080523
amendedasm_v97html; see also Bulman-Pozen, supranote 10, at 1283 n.98.
9

Brown, supranote 58 (emphasis added).

94
Tim Fernholz, Why Has the Obama AdministrationDeclared War on Medical Marijuana?,
NEW REPUBLIC (Nov. 9, 2011), http://www.tnr.com/article/politics/97203/Obama-medicalmarijuana-crackdown.
95
NUGENT, supra note 11, at 170.
96
See supratext accompanying note 11.

Disseminated by The Research Repository @ WVU, 2013

19

West Virginia Law Review, Vol. 116, Iss. 1 [2013], Art. 4

20

WEST VIRGINIA LAW REVIEW

[Vol. 116

main prohibited on both the federal and state levels. In essence, the federal executive's unpredicted and unrestrained shifts in enforcement policy-with their
disruption of the state regulatory scheme and antagonizing of the state governments-threaten cooperative federalism. If federalism is to be viewed as a cooperation between dual-sovereigns, then increased federal enforcement
measures can even be viewed as a threat to federalism itself. Some scholars
have even deemed this decriminalization and regulation of medical marijuana
an example of "uncooperative federalism," where states like California attempt
to assert their autonomy vis-i-vis the federal government despite the fact that
the federal drug laws were set up as a state-federal cooperative enforcement
scheme.97
V. COOPERATIVE FEDERALISM CONCERNS IN LIGHT OF THE RECENT
LEGALIZATION OF RECREATIONAL MARIJUANA IN Two STATES

While not central to the ultimate mission of this Article-to reconcile
state laws permitting medical marijuana with the categorical federal ban on the
drug-this Part briefly addresses the recently passed propositions in Colorado
and Washington that effectively legalized certain quantities of marijuana for
non-medical, recreational purposes. Essentially, the conflict between the laws
permitting medical marijuana in 21 states (as well as in the District of Columbia) and the CSA is the same as the conflict between the federal ban and the
new laws permitting recreational marijuana in Washington and Colorado. Both
conflicts create zones of nebulous legality, a situation where an activity is permitted (and, arguably, encouraged) by the state government and at the same
time criminally forbidden (and punishable) by the federal government.98 This
Article primarily seeks to explore the situation with medical marijuana; however, it is important to address a similar situation in light of the new laws in Colorado and Washington.
As a result of the 2012 Election, Colorado and Washington have become the only two states to legalize marijuana for recreational purposes. On
November 6, 2012, voters in both states passed ballot referenda that permit the
possession, cultivation, distribution, and sale of limited amounts of marijuana
9
Bulman-Pozen, supra note 10, at 1283-84 (noting that the federal drug enforcement actually depends on state law enforcement, a policy shown by the fact that approximately 99% of marijuana arrests are made by state and local law enforcement officials).
98
Because of the similarity of the conflict, this Article suggests that the analyses of the issue
and proposed solution will be the same or similar for the federal conflict with state laws permitting medical marijuana as they are for the new state laws permitting recreational marijuana. For
example, Part III explores whether the federal methods of preemption, conditional spending, and
commandeering could prove as a viable means of resolving by doing away with the state laws
permitting medical marijuana in one way or another. The same analysis-it could be proposedcould apply to the new recreational marijuana laws. The same could be said for Part VI, which
proposes a federal carve-out exemption to the CSA for states with laws that permit or regulatory
schemes that encourage the usage of marijuana-whether medical or recreational.
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for personal and recreational use. 99 In both states, the already-existing medical
marijuana-related lawsoo will remain intact.
Voters in Washington passed Washington Initiative 502, a ballot measure which purported to remove state-law prohibitions of marijuana and allow
for its possession in limited quantities.10 The initiative went into effect on December 6, 2012.102 Acting as an amendment to the Revised Code of Washington, Initiative 502 will permit adults aged 21 years and older to legally possess
1 ounce of useable marijuana, 16 ounces of marijuana-infused solid food, and
72 ounces of marijuana-infused liquid product.' 03 The initiative allows licensed
marijuana-related businesses to sell the drug regulated by the Washington State
Liquor Control Board, which has until December 1, 2013, to establish the remainder of the related rules and regulations. 104
Similarly, voters in Colorado approved a ballot measure 0 5 to amend
the state constitution to allow for the personal use and regulation of marijuana
under a scheme similar to the one regulating alcohol.106 Colorado Amendment
64 amended the state constitution in order to allow the limited cultivation, possession, sale, and consumption of marijuana for recreational purposes.10 7 The
Amendment prescribes penalties for driving under the influence of marijuana
that are similar to the penalties for driving under the influence of alcohol. 08 On

9
See
COLO.
CONST.
art.
XVIII,
§
14,
available
at
http://www.fcgov.com/mmj/pdf/amendment64.pdf (proposed as, "Colorado Amendment 64");
2013 Wash. Legis. Serv. ch. 3 (I.M. 502) (West) (Initiative Measure-Marijuana-Legalization and
Regulation).
'
COLO. CONST. art. XVIII, § 14; WASH. REV. CODE § 69.51A.005 (2013).

lot See Letter from Jeffrey T. Even, Deputy Solicitor Gen. of the State of Wash., to The Honorable
Sam
Reed
(July
15,
2011),
available
at
http://www.newapproachwa.org/sites/newapproachwa.org/files/I-502%20(marijuana)%2OBT%
20and%20Summary.pdf.
102

WASH. STATE LIQUOR CONTROL BD., FACT SHEET: INITIATIVE 502's IMPACT ON THE
STATE
LIQUOR
CONTROL
BOARD
(2012),
available
at

WASHINGTON

http://www.liq.wa.gov/publications/Marijuana/I-502/Fact-Sheet-1502-11-7-12.pdf.
103
See 2013 Wash. Legis. Serv. ch. 3 (I.M. 502) (West) (Initiative Measure-MarijuanaLegalization and Regulation); AM. CIVIL LIBERTIES UNION Of WASH., 1-502: WASHINGTON'S NEW
MARIJUANA

REGULATION LAW:

FREQUENTLY

ASKED

QUESTIONS,

(2012),

available at

http://www.aclu-wa.org/sites/default/files/attachments/Marijuana%201-502%20FAQs%20%20110712.pdf.
104

id.

'os

COLO.

CONST.

art.

XVIII,

§

14,

available

at

http://www.fcgov.com/mmj/pdf/amendment64.pdf (proposed as "Colorado Amendment 64").
106 See John Ingold, Colorado Marijuana Measure's Backers, Foes Buoyed by Out-of-State
Support, DENVER POST (June 11, 2012, 1:00 AM), http://www.denverpost.com/ci_20828371/outstate-support-buoys-backers-foes-colorado-marijuana.
107

COLO. CONST. art. XVIII,

108

Id.

§

16.
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December 10, 2012, Governor John Hickenlooper signed the measure, whereby
it officially became part of the state's constitution.
The analysis as to whether these laws are legal in the face of the CSA
would be virtually identical to the analysis with regard to laws permitting medical marijuana.109 First, as noted in Parts II.A. 1 and II.A.3, it is unlikely that the
federal government could or would use commandeering or conditional spending to subvert the new recreational marijuana laws in Washington and Colorado. 0 Commandeering would likely prove unconstitutional.' The federal government has not proposed revoking federal drug enforcement-related funding
so as to coax the states to do away with these laws. It is unlikely that the federal
government would take such an action, especially considering the degree to
which the federal government relies on the states to assist in the enforcement of

the CSA."12
Whether these measures would be preempted by the CSA is more of an
unsettled legal issue, in light of the Supreme Court's hesitation to decide that
issue in Raich." 3 However, the expansion of legalization of recreational marijuana by Washington Initiative 502 and Colorado Amendment 64 might prove
more of an affront to the CSA than the medical marijuana laws, which were
limited to niche usage of the drug.'1 4 These two laws could prove fodder for a

See supra Part III.
110 See supra Parts III.A.1, III.A.3.
109

II See Printz v. United States, 521 U.S. 898 (1997); New York v. United States, 505 U.S. 144
(1992).
112

See supra Part III.B.

See 545 U.S. 1 (2005).
The issue as to whether California's medical marijuana laws are preempted was explored
in Part III.A.2, supra. While that section concluded that the California CSA has not, as of yet,
been preempted by federal law, the issue in other states is still up for debate. For example, the
Arizona Attorney General released a statement suggesting that the provisions of the Arizona
medical marijuana law that authorizes the growing or distribution of marijuana would be
preempted, but the state's issuance of identification cards for that purpose would not. See Re:
Preemption of the Arizona Medical Marijuana Act (Proposition 203), Op. Att'y Gen. No. 112001 (2012),
available at https://www.azag.gov/sites/default/files/sites/all/docs/Opinions/
2012/112-001.pdf; Tom Home, Ariz. Att'y Gen., Press Release, Medical Marijuana AG Opinion
https://www.azag.gov/press-release/medical-marijuana-ag-opinionReleased, available at
released. The Attorney General of Michigan reached the same conclusion in an advisory opinion
released November 10, 2011. See Michigan Medical Marihuana Act: Return of Marihuana to Patient or Caregiver Upon Release from Custody, Op. Att'y Gen. No. 7262 (2011), available at
http://www.ag.state.mi.us/opinion/datafiles/201Os/oplO341.htm. The Oregon Supreme Court
took a similar stance in deciding that Congress could have the power to preempt the Oregon medical marijuana law because the law authorizes conduct that has been prohibited by federal law.
See Emerald Steel Fabricators, Inc. v. Bureau of Labor and Indus., 230 P.3d 518, 533-34 (Or.
2010).
113

114
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test case of preemption in the federal courts, considering the press and buzz
they have garnered in the months following the election. 5
What is certain, as with the medical marijuana situation in California,
is the uncertainty with which the federal enforcement branch will approach
these new measures in Washington and Colorado. Immediately after the passage of the Washington and Colorado ballot measures, the DOJ released a
statement, in which the Executive Branch unequivocally asserted that the newly
approved laws would have no effect on the federal ban under the CSA." 6 Even
Colorado governor John Hickenlooper echoed this sentiment in his infamous
"Cheetos or Goldfish" comment which expressed concern about federal enforcement of the CSA in spite of Colorado Amendment 64. 17 President
Obama, in an echo, perhaps, of the Ogden Memo, stated that federal authorities
should not target recreational users in Washinton and Colorado who are acting
within the state laws and regulatory schemes.
Sure enough, on August 29, 2013, Deputy Attorney General James
Cole released yet another memorandum to United States Attorneys this one
containing the simple subject line "Guidance Regarding Marijuana Enforcement."119 This memorandum acknowledges the prior two (October 2009 and
June 2011) and seeks to update federal marijuana enforcement policy in light of
the Washington and Colorado initiatives. Echoing the Ogden Memo of 2009,
this memo asserts that the Department of Justice "is . . . committed to using its

limited investigative and prosecutorial resources to address the most significant

Jonathan Martin, State Could Be Test Case in Marituana Legalization, SEATTLE TIMES
(Sept.
23,
2012,
10:17
AM),
http://seattletimes.com/html/localnews/2019235344
marijuana23m.html; Jacob Sullum, Can the Feds Stop Colorado and Washingtonfrom Legalizing Pot?, REASON (Nov. 12, 2012, 1:20 PM), http://reason.com/blog/2012/11/12/can-the-fedsstop-colorado-and-washingto.
115

11
On November 7, 2012, DOJ spokesperson Nanda Chitre said, "The Department's enforcement of the Controlled Substances Act remains unchanged. In enacting the Controlled Substances Act, Congress determined that marijuana is a Schedule I controlled substance. We are reviewing the ballot initiatives and have no additional comment at this time." See Byron Tau, DOJ:
Federal Maryuana Enforcement Remains "Unchanged," POLITICO 44 (Nov. 7, 2012, 2:57 PM),
http://www.politico.com/politico44/2012/1 1/doj-federal-marijuana-enforcement-remainsunchanged- 148901.html.
117
The full statement, posted on Governor Hickenlooper's Facebook page on the evening of
Election Day, November 6, 2012, at 10:29 p.m., was: "'The voters have spoken and we have to
respect their will . . . . This will be a complicated process, but we intend to follow through. That
said, federal law still says marijuana is an illegal drug so don't break out the Cheetos or gold fish
[sic] too quickly.'" See Rachel Weiner, Hickenlooper on ColoradoPot Vote: 'Don't Break out
the Cheetos,' WASH. POST (Nov. 7, 2012, 12:05), http://www.washingtonpost.com/blogs/postpolitics/wp/2012/11/07/hickenlooper-on-amendment-64-dont-break-out-the-cheetos.
I1
See Susan Heavey, Users Should Not Be Targeted in States that Legalized Pot: Obama,
REUTERS (Dec. 14, 2012, 3:02 PM), http://www.reuters.com/article/2012/12/14/us-usamarijuana-obama-idUSBRE8BDOQ720121214.
119
Cole Memo, supra note 9.
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threats in the most effective, consistent, and rational way."l 2 0 The memo goes
on to list "certain enforcement priorities that are particularly important to the
federal government," which include, for example, preventing marijuana use and
possession on federal land and in states where marijuana has not been legalized
as well as preventing state-authorized marijuana activity carried out in conjunction with trafficking of other illegal drugs.121 The memo encourages United
States Attorneys to use their prosecutorial discretion in enforcing these priorities and notes that marijuana-related activity in compliance with the Colorado
and Washington laws is less likely to threaten those objectives. 2 2 However,
this memorandum reasserts the power of federal prosecutors to enforce the
CSA in Washington and Colorado to the fullest extent, even against those acting in compliance with those states' new recreational marijuana laws and regu-

lations.123
VI. A PROPOSED EXEMPTION FROM FEDERAL LAW ENFORCEMENT FOR
STATE-LEGAL MEDICAL MARIJUANA

When it comes to enforcement of the CSA, the federal government has
extremely limited resources. As noted, federal law enforcement only accounts
for approximately one percent of all drug-related arrests in the United States.12 4
Therefore, as the Ogden Memo indicated, the federal executive must choose to
allocate its resources with the understanding that it simply will not be able to
arrest and prosecute all offenders of federal drug laws. The federal government
has already conceded this: in both the Ogden and Cole Memos the DOJ
acknowledged that its "investigative and prosecutorial resources" are "limited"
and it must therefore pick and choose which types of federal offenders are
worth its resources. 12 5 The federal government, in essence, relies on the states
to assist in the execution of the CSA.126

120

id

121

Id.

122

id.

Id ("[N]othing herein precludes investigation or prosecution, even in the absence of any
one of the factors listed above, in particular circumstances where investigation and prosecution
otherwise serves an important federal interest.").
124
Bulman-Pozen, supra note 10, at 1283-84; Mikos, supra note 10, at 1464-65.
125 Ogden Memo, supra note 1; Cole Memo supra note 9. Professor Mikos hypothesizes that if
the states did not cooperate with the federal government in enforcing the federal drug laws, only
0.05% of medical marijuana users were by uncovered by federal authorities. Mikos, supra note
10, at 1465.
See supra Part III.B (suggesting that the CSA's lack of field preemption languages shows
126
that the federal government's policy of drug prohibition was designed to be a cooperation with
the states).
123
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Because of this reliance, instead of attempting to subvert the state medical marijuana schemes, the federal government should be engaging in a more
"cooperative federalism" system by working with the states to prioritize federal
enforcement resources in a manner consistent with state policy and regulations.
In order to achieve this balance between the state and federal enforcement policies and to restore cooperative federalism, the federal government needs to
adopt an enforcement policy with regard to medical marijuana that complies
with state laws and regulations. Calling on the federal executive may prove to
be futile in prosecuting those who violate the CSA by cultivating, possessing,
or distributing marijuana for medical purposes-even in compliance with state
laws and regulations-federal law enforcement agents are acting wholly within
the scope of their duties and obligation to enforce and uphold the federal CSA.
After elaborating on the improbability of executive self-restraint in Part VI.A,
Part VI.B proposes that Congress act to restore the balance of cooperative federalism in the realm of nationwide drug enforcement. In order to do this, Congress needs to exempt the applicability of the CSA's proscription of medical
marijuana to those acting in compliance with state laws and regulations.
A.

The Futility ofInternalExecutive Restraint

The Ogden-Cole Memos' shift is a poignant illustration of the problems of assigning the task of preservation of cooperative federalism-or federalism in general for that matter-to the Executive Branch of the federal government. Seemingly on a whim, the DOJ and various United States Attorneys
can focus and re-focus efforts on medical marijuana distributors acting in full
compliance with state laws.
The federal executive policy can be characterized as spottily inconsistent at best and whimsical at worst. In addition to the recent crackdowns in
California, federal medical marijuana enforcement policy in Colorado is illustrative of the rampant uncertainty that pervades the issue. In a December 2011
questioning by the House Judiciary Committee of Attorney General Eric Holder, Representative Jared Polis of Colorado asked Holder the following series of
questions:
Polis: I wanted to see whether I can get your assurance that our
definition of "caregiver" in our state's constitution will be given some deference by the U.S. Attorney General's office.
Holder: I'm not familiar with the provision, but what we said
in the [Ogden] Memo we still intend, which is that given the
limited resources that we have, and if there are states that are . .
. that have medical marijuana provisions ... if in fact people
are not using the policy decision that we have made to use marijuana in a way that is not consistent with the state statute we
will not use our limited resources in that way ....
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Polis: [Referring to the recent crackdown in California] I'd like
to ask whether our state regulation-our thoughtful state regulation[s]-. . . provide any additional protection to Colorado
from federal intervention?
Holder: [O]ur thought was that where a state has taken a position, as it passed a law, and people are acting in conformity
with the law-not abusing the law, but acting in conformity
with it-and again given our limited resources that would not
be an enforcement priority for the Justice Department.
Polis: Is there any intention of the Department of Justice to
prosecute bankers for doing business with licensed and regulated medical marijuana providers in the states?
Holder: Again .

.

. consistent with the notion on how we use

our limited resources, again, if the bankers, the people seeking
to make the deposits are acting in conformity with state law
that would not aain be an enforcement priority for ... the Justice Department.
Within three months after this direct assurance by the head of the DOJ
that entities acting in compliance with state law would not be a federal law enforcement priority, a Colorado-based United States Attorney announced that
there exists no "safe harbor" for medical marijuana dispensaries acting in compliance with state law because their activities nonetheless remain illegal under
federal law. 128 While the issue being addressed concerned dispensaries located
within 1,000 feet of schools, the U.S. Attorney's office stated that it is "not
possible to answer whether a shop in compliance with state rules and regulations and not located near a school would still face any trouble."l 2 9

JaredPolis31275, Polis Questions AG Holder on Medical Marijuana Enforcement,
YouTUBE (Dec. 8, 2011), http://www.youtube.com/watch?v-DCNutE9nUVk. President Barack
Obama made similar promises. See, e.g., Gary Nelson, He FavorsLong-Term Timber-Payment
2008),
http://www.mailtribune.com
(Mar. 23,
Solutions, S. OR. MAIL TRIB.
/apps/pbcs.dll/article?AID=/20080323/NEWS/803230336 ("As for medical marijuana ... I think
the basic concept of using medical marijuana for the same purposes and with the same controls as
other drugs prescribed by doctors, I think that's entirely appropriate .... I'm not going to be using Justice Department resources to try to circumvent state laws on this issue.").
128 Reman Rahman, US. Attorney: No Pot Shop Safe from Federal Enforcement, ASPEN
TIMEs, Mar. 3, 2012, available at http://www.aspentimes.com/article/20120303/NEWS/
120309956/1077&ParentProfile=1058.
129
id
127
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At best, the shift from the Holder questioning to the latest Colorado
U.S. Attorney letter can be viewed as confusion or uncertainty13 0 among federal
executive law enforcement. At worst, it can be viewed as a blatant attempt to
subvert state medical marijuana laws, undermining popular state policies.
However, notwithstanding specific policy-based law enforcement decisions
made by the Obama Administration,' 3' it still remains the duty of the federal
executive branch to uphold federal law.132 Ultimately, the CSA remains the law
of the land, and the executive branch has the constitutional duty to enforce that
law.' 33 As such, that same governmental branch simply cannot be left to its own
devices to preserve federalism and resolve the threat to cooperative federalism
posed by the federal-state dichotomy in medical marijuana laws. The experience of the federal executive's inconsistent policy in Colorado, California,' 34
and other states with medical marijuana exemptions' 3 5 is a testament to that reality.136

130
A Colorado lawyer has noted that such "uncertainty" could "bring[ ] an 'entire economic
sector of Colorado on its knees."' Id.
131
i.e., The Ogden-Cole Memos shift.
132
U.S. CONST. art. II.
1
See id. That federal enforcement agents have the obligation to uphold the CSA has been
affirmed by the head of the Executive, President Barack Obama, who has stated the following:
I can't nullify congressional law. I can't ask the Justice Department to say,
"Ignore completely a federal law that's on the books." . . . [W]e put the Justice Department in a very difficult place if we're telling them, "This is supposed to be against the law, but we want you to turn the other way." That's
not something we're going to do.
Jann S. Wenner, Ready for the Fight: Rolling Stone Interview with Barack Obama, ROLLING
STONE (Apr. 25, 2012, 8:00 AM), http://www.rollingstone.com/politics/news/ready-for-the-fightrolling-stone-interview-with-barack-obama-20120425?page=2.
134
See supra Part III.A; see also Complaint, Americans for Safe Access v. Holder, No.
11 CV
5248
(N.D.
Cal.
Oct.
27,
2011),
available
at
http://americansforsafeaccess.org/downloads/ASA_vHolder.pdf (outlining various initiatives
the federal executive has taken with regard to shutting down medical marijuana dispensaries in
Northern California).
135 See, e.g., Bob Christie, US Attorney Issues Warning Over
AZ Medical Marijuana,

ARIZONA DAILY STAR, May 2, 2011 (Arizona); Dominic Holden, Obama Administration Warns It

May Prosecute State Employees if Gregoire Signs Medical Pot Bill, THE STRANGER (Apr. 14,
2011, 6:53 PM), http://slog.thestranger.com/slog/archives/2011/04/14/obama-adminstrationwarns-it-may-prosecute-state-employees-if-gregoire-signs-medical-pot-law (Washington); David
Klepper, US Attorney Issues Warning on Medical Pot Centers, BOSTON.COM, Apr. 26, 2012,
http://www.boston.com/news/local/rhodeisland/articles/2012/04/26/ri govusattorneymeet_o
n_medicalpot centers/ (Rhode Island); Matt Voltz, US. Attorney Breaks Silence on Montana
Medical Marituana Probe, MISSOULIAN, Apr. 23, 2012, http://missoulian.com/news/state-andregional/u-s-attorney-breaks-silence-on-montana-medical-marijuana-probe/article_7df4fa6af260-53b0-9fca-c4c97fedlf64.html (Montana).
136
Note that it is not the states' responsibility to enforce federal law.
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A CongressionalExemption for Medical Marituanain Compliance
with State Law

Because it appears that the federal executive could not viably preserve
the federalism balance, this Article turns to Congress. This Article proposes
that Congress act to reconcile the state-federal conflict of laws regarding medical marijuana by creating an exemption from the CSA for medical marijuana
usage and distribution in compliance with approved state laws and regulatory
schemes. At the most, Congress could amend the CSA to expressly provide the
exemption, or, at the very least, pass an act prohibiting the Executive from enforcing the CSA's medical marijuana proscription in states that permit it. Such
an exemption would allow states to proceed with their medical marijuana programs while at the same time keeping the drug illegal at the federal level. The
result would be that medical marijuana would be presumptively prohibited nationwide, except in states that take affirmative legislative and administrative
steps (as some have already done) to legalize it.
It is extremely important to note that this proposal does not call for a
federal exemption to the CSA for medical marijuana. On one hand, in states
like California that elect to legalize medical marijuana, the proposed exemption
would allow those states' legislation and regulation to operate unimpeded by
federal disruption. This will also allow these states to work with the federal authorities in focusing on the state-federal unity of interests in drug enforcement;
for example California state agents will still be able and encouraged to work
with their federal counterparts to curb the distribution and possession of drugs
that remain illegal on both the federal and state level. On the other hand, in
states that wish to keep medical marijuana prohibited, state authorities will continue to cooperate with the federal government to execute the CSA and its state
law counterpart.
The reason why this compromise is necessary stems from the so-called
"laboratories of experimentation" 37 notion of federalism that a one-size-fits-all
fix is not a viable or practicable solution to address an issue that affects over
300 million people with hundreds if not thousands of diverse values, principles,
and beliefs. As mentioned, this Article does not purport to opine on the policy
values of the legalization of medical marijuana. Rather, this Article argues that
if the people or legislature of a state decides on a social issue like medical marijuana, then the federal government should give some deference to those decisions. When it comes to social issues, the state lawmaking process-especially
in states that pass laws through popular referenda-is arguably better at achieving the will of the people than is the federal government. State governments are
more localized, and thus more apt at deciding how to specifically address a
m See New State Ice Co. v. Liebmann, 285 U.S. 262, 311 (1932) (Brandeis, J., dissenting)
("It is one of the happy incidents of the federal system that a single courageous State may, if its
citizens choose, serve as a laboratory; and try novel social and economic experiments without
risk to the rest of the country.").
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problem that affects its citizens. The very existence of federalism acknowledges that one solution in one state might not be best for another state, let alone the
rest of the country.
A potential hurdle to this proposal is the argument that this would create a federal scheme that would have different consequences in different states.
For example, a medical marijuana dispensary in California would not be subject to federal prosecution as would its counterpart (if such a thing existed) in,
say, New York. This would, it can be argued, undermine the notion that federal
laws are to be uniformly applied across the several states. However, such a
Congressional exemption to federal law has been seen before, namely in the
realm of social security. In Charles C. Steward Machine Co. v. Davis,

138

the

U.S. Supreme Court, in an opinion by Justice Benjamin N. Cardozo, upheld a
federal tax and spending unemployment compensation program to be applied
across the nation as part of the Social Security Act. Built into the federal program was an exception for states that adopted unemployment compensation
programs of their own: employers in these states would receive a 90% federal
tax credit; employers in states without such comparable programs would not.13 9
In upholding the state-specific exemption program as constitutional, Justice
Cardozo mused on the importance of having local solutions to local problems.
The state-by-state exemption to the Social Security Act-an early example of
cooperative federalism-showed that "Congress believed that the general welfare would better be promoted by relief through local units than by the system
then in vogue . . . .,140 If a state-Alabama, as was the case in Steward Machine Co.-created an unemployment tax and spending scheme that was better
tailored to fit the needs of its citizens, Congress could very well allow that program to take the place of the broader federal one.141
The cooperative federalism principles from the Steward Machine Co.
opinion are easily applicable to the medical marijuana conflict and the statespecific Congressional exemption to the CSA that this Article proposes. Generally, just like the Social Security Act, the CSA was meant to be a cooperative
effort between the federal government and the states. If various states wish to
experiment in unique ways to solve the problem of drugs, then Congress indeed
can and should defer to those states, just like Congress did with the unemployment tax exemptions at issue in Steward Machine Co. 14 2 Such an exemption to

1

13
140

301 U.S. 548 (1937).
Id. at 574.
Id. at 589.

141
Id. at 597-98 ("Alabama is seeking and obtaining a credit of many millions in favor of her
citizens out of the Treasury of the nation. Nowhere in our scheme of government-in the limitations express or implied of our federal constitution-do we find that she is prohibited from assenting to conditions that will assure a fair and just requital for benefits received.").
142 Id. at 593-94.
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the CSA will allow states to work with the federal government while also promoting the general welfare through "local units."l43
Such a proposal may already be gaining traction among circles of the
federal legislature, especially in the aftermath of the 2012 Election. Senator
Patrick Leahy of Vermont, Chairman of the Senate Judiciary Committee, has
announced that he will hold a hearing on how to reconcile the CSA with the
various state medical and recreational marijuana allowances early in the term of
the 113th Congress. 14 4 Among the avenues Senator Leahy has already suggested is the following, which essentially mirrors this Article's federal exception
proposal: "One option would be to amend the Federal Controlled Substances
Act to allow possession of up to one ounce of marijuana, at least in jurisdictions where it is legal under state law."l 45
In addition, Congresswoman Diana DeGette of Colorado has introduced a bipartisan bill which hints at a similar exemption. The proposed Respect States' and Citizens' Rights Act of 2012 would amend the CSA to "provide that federal law shall not preempt State law."l 46 While this bill would not
affirmatively carve out an exception to the CSA in states that have allowances
for medical and recreational marijuana usage, it would definitively resolve a
lingering preemption question.14 7 Interestingly, the bipartisan bill has received
support and sponsorship from Congressman Mike Coffman who was a staunch
opponent of Amendment 64.148 "1 strongly oppose the legalization of marijuana, but I also have an obligation to respect the will of the voters given the passage of this initiative, and so I feel obligated to support this legislation." 4 9 This
line of reasoning is one happily endorsed by this Article, which, as Rep. Coffman appears to do, does not place a policy-judgment on state marijuana laws

Id. at 589.
Press Release, Patrick Leahy, U.S. Senator, Leahy to Examine Marijuana Policy: Plans
Senate Judiciary Committee Hearing Next Year (Dec. 13, 2012), available at
http://www.leahy.senate.gov/press/leahy-to-examine-marijuana-policy.
145
Letter from Patrick Leahy, U.S. Senator, to Gil Kerlikowske, Director, Office of National
Drug Control Policy (Dec. 6, 2012), available at http://www.leahy.senate.gov/imo/media/doc/126-12%20copy%20PJL%20to%20Kerlikowske%20re%20-%20fed%20drug%20control%20 policy.pdf.
146
H.R.
6606,
112th
Cong. (2012),
available at http://thomas.loc.gov/cgibin/query/z?cl 12:H.R.6606:.
147
Id ("In the case of any State law that pertains to marihuana, no provision of this title shall
be construed as indicating an intent on the part of the Congress to occupy the field in which that
provision operates, including criminal penalties, to the exclusion of State law on the same subject
matter, nor shall any provision of this title be construed as preempting any such State law.").
148
Kurtis Lee, DeGette Files Bill to Require Feds to Respect Marijuana Law, THE DENVER
POST, Nov. 16, 2012, available at http://www.denverpost.com/ci_22011789/colorado-democratsurge-u-s-attorney-general-marijuana.
149 id
143

144
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when analyzing the federalism concerns and quandaries they raise, and offers
solutions as to how to reconcile the federal-state conflict.
VII. CONCLUSION: THE VIABILITY OF A STATE-SPECIFIC FEDERAL EXEMPTION

The idea of an exemption from enforcement of the CSA in states that
allow for the limited usage of medical marijuana may not be so far-fetched. The
expansion of state-by-state medical marijuana exemptions-about forty percent
of the states have legalized medical marijuana 150- supports the notion that the
national opinion on the issue is shifting. Additionally, since the passage of the
CSA in the 1970s, popular support for medical marijuana exemptions has
grown considerably; in several national polls, a strong majority of respondents
support the legalization of marijuana for medical purposes.1s1
Furthermore, it should be noted that in 2010 the District of Columbia
Council approved a measure that would allow patients to receive medical marijuana from state-regulated dispensaries.1 52 After being signed into law by the
District's mayor, Congress did not exercise its power to block the law from taking effect as it had done after a similar measure was passed via referendum by
69% of the voters in 1998. On January 1, 2011, the District's medical marijuana law went into effect. 154 Since then, the District's Health Department has
selected and approved locations for the medical marijuana dispensaries. 155

Iso
The current count is 21 states plus the District of Columbia. See supra note 26. While an
amendment to the federal constitution seems unlikely at the present-21 states being a far cry
from the requisite three-fourths mark pursuant to Article V of the Constitution-40% of the
states is a considerable figure considering the first of such laws, California's CUA, was only enacted about 15 years ago.
151 See, e.g., Press Release, Pew Research Center, Public Support for Legalizing Medical Marijuana (Apr. 1, 2010), available at http://www.people-press.org/2010/04/01/public-support-forlegalizing-medical-marijuana (73%); Fred Backus, Poll: Public Supports Medical Marituana,but
available at
18,
2011),
NEWS
(Nov.
Not Full Pot Legalization, CBS
http://www.cbsnews.com/8301-503544_162-57327004-503544/poll-public-supports-medicalmarijuana-but-not-full-pot-legalization/ (77%); see generally NAT'L ORG. FOR THE REFORM OF
MARIJUANA
LAWS,
Favorable
Medical
Marijuana
Polls,
NORML,
http://norml.org/library/item/favorable-medical-marijuana-polls (last visited September 7, 2013)
(chronicling both nationwide and state-by-state polls on medical marijuana).
152
Ashley Southall, Washington, D.C, Approves Medical Use of Marifuana, N.Y. TIMES,
May 4, 2010, at Al7.
153
David C. Lipscomb, D.C. Officials Cautious on Legal Maryuana, WASH. TIMES, Dec. 10,
2009, available at http://www.washingtontimes.com/news/2009/dec/10/council-cautious-onlegal-marijuana/.
154
See D.C. CODE § 7-1671.02 (2013); see also supra note 26.
155
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at
27,
2012),
available
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WASH.
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From a cynical standpoint, the legality of medical marijuana in the seat
of the federal government can be viewed as hypocritical: that Congress and the
various executive law enforcement agencies that continue to assert the illegality
of medical marijuana are turning a blind eye to its usage in its backyard. However, this Article takes the position that the District's medical marijuana law illustrates a changing of the mindset of Congress to one of cooperative federalism for drug regulation. Congress' implicit approval of the District's lawindeed, Congress had full authority to legitimately block it, like it did in
1998-evinces a recognition that a uniform drug policy that applies to each and
every semi-autonomous subdivision of the United States may not be what's
best for the "general welfare." Hopefully, for the sake of cooperative federalism, the next step will be for Congress to officially recognize this reality and
enact an exemption to the federal ban on medical marijuana in states where its
usage is legal and regulated.
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